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Abstract. - We propose a rotationally-invariant quantum key distribution scheme that uses a pair
of orthogonal qubit trines, realized as mixed states of three physical qubits. The measurement
outcomes do not depend on how Alice and Bob choose their individual reference frames. The
efficient key generation by two-way communication produces two independent raw keys, a bit key
and a trit key. For a noiseless channel, Alice and Bob get a total of 0.573 key bits per trine state
sent (98% of the Shannon limit). This exceeds by a considerable amount the yield of standard
trine schemes, which ideally attain half a key bit per trine state. Eavesdropping introduces an
ǫ-fraction of unbiased noise, ensured by twirling if necessary. The security analysis reveals an
asymmetry in Eve’s conditioned ancillas for Alice and Bob resulting from their inequivalent roles
in the key generation. Upon simplifying the analysis by a plausible symmetry assumption, we find
that a secret key can be generated if the noise is below the threshold set by ǫ = 0.197.
Introduction. – Mutually non-orthogonal quantum
states are important in quantum key distribution (QKD)
because such states cannot be completely distinguished
from each other and hence they are intentionally used to
transmit classical information while preventing eavesdrop-
ping. For qubits, the qubit trine represents the smallest
complete set of non-orthogonal states. Earlier trine-based
protocols include the schemes by Bechmann-Pasquinucci
and Peres [1] and by Phoenix, Barnett, and Chefles [2].
When QKD is performed, it is generally assumed that
Alice and Bob share a common reference frame, the precise
nature of which depends on the specific information carri-
ers involved. For instance, correct orientation of Alice and
Bob’s coordinates is necessary for proper alignment of the
preparation and measurement apparatus. Practical imple-
mentations of cryptographic protocols require establishing
a rigid shared frame in advance or a frequent automatic re-
alignment. A lack of a shared reference frame is equivalent
to the presence of decoherence in the quantum channel [3].
In this contribution, we describe a trine-based crypto-
graphic protocol that uses reference-frame-free qubits and
a novel scheme for key generation. We report the asymp-
totic noise threshold below which this QKD procedure is
secure. The security analysis involves a very plausible, yet
unproven, simplifying symmetry assumption.
Basics of trine schemes. – A qubit trine is rep-
resented by a symmetric set of three states lying in the
XZ-plane of the Bloch sphere, where adjacent vectors are
separated by 120◦; see fig. 1. Let us call the qubit trine
T = {|A〉, |B〉, |C〉}. Alice prepares her qubits in any one
of the trine states with equal probability, and sends these
qubits one at a time to Bob. Bob measures the qubits he
receives with a probability operator measurement (POM)
whose outcomes are not projectors to the trine T , such
as |A〉〈A| but rather to states orthogonal to T , i.e., states
belonging to the set T ′ = {|A′〉, |B′〉, |C′〉}, where∣∣〈A|A′〉∣∣2 = 0 , ∣∣〈A|B′〉∣∣2 = ∣∣〈A|C′〉∣∣2 = 3
4
, (1)
with analogous relations holding for |B〉 and |C〉. Since
Alice works only with the trine T while Bob is concerned
only with states from the complementary trine T ′, we can
simplify matters by treating corresponding states of T and
T ′ as identical. For example, if Alice sends A, we say Bob
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Fig. 1: Qubit trine T and complementary trine T ′ in the Bloch
representation. The projectors on the respective kets are all
symbolized by vectors in the XZ-plane.
never measures A but has equal probability of obtaining
either B or C. In this description, the joint probabilities of
the quantum communication channel are given by table 1,
for which
I(A : B) = log2
3
2
= 0.585 (2)
is the mutual information I(A : B) between Alice and
Bob. With such a noiseless trine channel, then, they can
generate up to 0.585 secret key bits per qubit sent.
The double trine scheme. – If Alice and Bob use
physical qubits for the logical qubits of the trine, they
must be sure to agree on the coordinates for preparing
and measuring their quantum signals. However, they can
skip this problem altogether by using reference-frame-free
(RFF) qubits. In our scheme a logical qubit is constructed
by coupling three physical qubits. For concreteness, we
consider the physical qubits to be spin- 12 particles (with
|0〉 for spin-up and |1〉 for spin-down) and combine their
angular momenta in the appropriate manner.
Following the recipe of ref. [4], we consider two trines.
In the subspace (j = 12 , m =
1
2 ) we have the trine
|p1〉 =
(|001〉 − |010〉)/√2 ,
|p2〉 =
(|100〉 − |001〉)/√2 ,
|p3〉 =
(|010〉 − |100〉)/√2 , (3)
and the states
|q1〉 =
(|101〉 − |110〉)/√2 ,
|q2〉 =
(|110〉 − |011〉)/√2 ,
|q3〉 =
(|011〉 − |101〉)/√2 , (4)
constitute the trine in the subspace (j = 12 , m = − 12 ). All
relevant states are in the j = 12 sector of the three spin-
1
2
atoms and, for the sake of simplifying the notation, we
shall consistently ignore the empty j = 32 sector.
Table 1: Joint probabilities for the noiseless trine channel.
A
Bob
B C
A 0
1
6
1
6
A
li
ce
B
1
6
0
1
6
C
1
6
1
6
0
The sums of the projectors to corresponding p- and q-
states are
Wi = |pi〉〈pi|+ |qi〉〈qi| = Sjk , (5)
where Sjk projects on the singlet sector for atoms j and
k, and the indices ijk pertain to all cyclic permutations
of 123. By construction, the Wis are rotationally invari-
ant and hence have the same properties for all reference
frames—they are RFF operators. We note that the Wis
have two eigenvalues 0 and two eigenvalues 1, so that Wi
and 1−Wi project on orthogonal two-dimensional sub-
spaces, and
3∑
i=1
Wi =
3
2
, tr
{
Wi
}
= 2 , tr
{
WiWj
}
=
3δij + 1
2
(6)
are identities that will be relevant in what follows.
Because our scheme has two independent sets of trines,
we call it the double trine scheme. It works as follows.
Alice sends a random sequence of the states ρi =
1
2Wi to
Bob, with the three states occurring with equal frequency,
and Bob measures them with a POM whose outcomes are
Πj =
2
3 (1 −Wj). The resulting joint probabilities,
pij =
1
3
tr
{
ρiΠj
}
=
1− δij
6
(7)
are those of table 1.
Signal and idler qubit. – The sum of the three
p-kets of (3) vanishes—they are linearly dependent be-
cause the j = m = 12 sector is two-dimensional. A pair
|++〉, | −+〉 of orthogonal kets is identified by
(|p1〉, |p2〉, |p3〉) = (|++〉, | −+〉) 1√
2
(
1 ω ω2
1 ω2 ω
)
, (8)
where ω = exp(i2π/3), and likewise we have
(|q1〉, |q2〉, |q3〉) = (|+−〉, | − −〉) 1√
2
(
1 ω ω2
1 ω2 ω
)
(9)
for the q-states. We regard the four orthogonal states |±±〉
that span the j = 12 sectors of the three spin-
1
2 atoms as
two-qubits states [4] whereby, for example, ket |+−〉 has
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the signal qubit in the ‘+’ state and the idler qubit in the
‘−’ state.
The signal states |A〉, |B〉, |C〉 that we identify as
(|A〉, |B〉, |C〉) = (|+〉, |−〉) 1√
2
(
1 ω ω2
1 ω2 ω
)
(10)
form the single-qubit trine that matters. Upon denoting
the Pauli operators of the signal qubit by X , Y , and Z
and identifying |±〉 with the eigenkets of Y = iXZ, the
signal-qubit trine is in the XZ plane as depicted in fig. 1.
In view of
W1 = |A〉〈A|⊗1 , W2 = |B〉〈B|⊗1 , W3 = |C〉〈C|⊗1 ,
(11)
the idler sector is completely irrelevant: Alice encodes the
information in the signal qubit only, and Bob’s POM does
not probe the idler qubit at all. The sole purpose of the
idler qubit is to render possible the construction of the ro-
tationally invariant signal qubit. We can, therefore, think
of the double trine scheme as a generic scheme of the kind
described in the context of fig. 1 with the signal qubit
carrying the quantum state from Alice to Bob.
Common source scenario. – Rather than having
Alice prepare qubits in the trine states and send them to
Bob, who then analyzes them with the trine POM, we
can generate the joint probabilities of table 1 in a more
symmetric and largely equivalent way. In this alternative
scenario, a source distributes entangled two-qubit states
to Alice and Bob.
Ideally, the two signal qubits are in their singlet state
that is described by the statistical operator
ρ0 = |s〉〈s| with |s〉 = |+−〉 − | −+〉√
2
. (12)
On their respective qubits, Alice and Bob then both mea-
sure the same trine POM with the outcomes
Πi = |i〉2
3
〈i| for i = A,B,C . (13)
Indeed, the resulting joint probabilities,
pjk = tr
{
Πj ⊗Πk ρ0
}
for j, k = A,B,C , (14)
are those of table 1.
In the security analysis below, we shall assume that the
source is controlled by eavesdropper Eve. Her activities
will introduce noise into the quantum channel between
Alice and Bob, but they are only accepting qubits from a
source that looks like the singlet of (12) with an admixture
of unbiased noise,
ρǫ = |s〉(1− ǫ)〈s|+ ǫ
4
(15)
with 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1.
As far as Alice and Bob are concerned, the noise param-
eter ǫ characterizes the channel. In the presence of noise,
Table 2: Joint probabilities for the noisy trine channel.
A
Bob
B C
A
ǫ
9
3− ǫ
18
3− ǫ
18
A
li
ce
B
3− ǫ
18
ǫ
9
3− ǫ
18
C
3− ǫ
18
3− ǫ
18
ǫ
9
they observe errors in the trine channel: sometimes they
get the same measurement outcome for a particular qubit
pair, which does not happen in the noise-free case. Rather
than the noise-free joint probabilities of table 1, they now
have the probabilities of table 2.
But since their measurements yield only these nine joint
probabilities, Alice and Bob cannot determine all fifteen
parameters that specify the two-qubit state distributed by
the source. In this respect, the trine schemes are markedly
different from tomographic protocols [5], such as the six-
state protocol [6] or the Singapore protocol [7], in which
full tomography of the source state is central.
If Alice and Bob do not see the symmetric probabil-
ity table 2, they enforce the symmetry by twirling. For
this purpose, they carry out random bilateral rotations on
the qubits that leave the singlet component intact while
removing any bias from the noise.
Efficient generation of the raw dual key. – Once
Alice and Bob finish collecting and measuring their qubits,
they get a paired record of measurement results. Next,
they communicate over an authenticated public channel
to discuss the raw data and distill a cryptographic key.
Here we describe a new key generation method that yields
mutual information between Alice and Bob closer to the
Shannon limit for a trine-based channel [8]. We illustrate
the procedure with the sample results shown in table 3.
To begin, Alice chooses two time slots in a specified or-
der where her outcomes are different. Suppose she selects
columns 2 and 5 in table 3. Alice’s pair of letters in these
positions is CB. She tells Bob to look at his record at those
two particular time slots and he finds he has A in both.
He declares he has the same letter in both positions. Alice
quickly determines this letter to be A since it is the only
result consistent with the expected outcomes for a trine
protocol. Both record A for the key. Because there are
three possibilities in this scenario, we call this the trit key.
Alice and Bob discard the used time slots.
There is another situation to consider. Say for the next
round, Alice chooses columns 1 and 4. Bob finds BC for
these time slots and announces the following: Record 0 for
BC and 1 for CB. Since Alice has AB, she infers that Bob
must have BC, and both of them record 0 for the key. In
this case, there are two possibilities, so we call it the bit
key. Note that the order of the time slots selected matters:
4 G. Tabia and B.-G. Englert
Table 3: Example of measurement records for Alice and Bob.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Alice A C C B B A C
Bob B A A C A C B
they would both record 1 if Alice reversed the order.
The two situations—the trit case and the bit case—
are mutually exclusive events so the bit and trit keys are
independently built up from the raw data. In the noiseless
case, the trit case happens 14 of the time while the bit case
happens in the remaining 34 . It follows that the number of
key bits, per qubit exchanged, that Alice and Bob share
in the key sequences thus generated is given by
I(A : B) =
1
2
(
1
4
log2 3 +
3
4
log2 2
)
= 0.573 , (16)
which is 98% of the Shannon limit in (2).
Noise in the channel leads to errors in the shared keys,
since the unexpected result of getting the same letter dur-
ing transmission will sometimes occur. The probability
that the next letter pair contributes an entry to the trit
key is now ptrit =
1
12 (3− ǫ)(1 + ǫ), and the probability of
contributing to the bit key is pbit =
1
12 [(3− ǫ)2 + 4ǫ].
In the trit case, the correctly matched pairs in the key
(that is, both Alice and Bob write down the same letter,
whether A, B, or C) each have probability (3− ǫ)/(9+9ǫ);
the other six outcomes where they disagree have proba-
bility 2ǫ/(9 + 9ǫ) each. Likewise in the bit case, the two
instances when Alice and Bob agree both have probability
1
2 (3−ǫ)2/[(3−ǫ)2+4ǫ], while for the other two where they
disagree the probability is 2ǫ/[(3− ǫ)2 + 4ǫ] each.
These probabilities yield
Itrit(A : B) =
3− ǫ
3 + 3ǫ
log2
3− ǫ
1 + ǫ
+
4ǫ
3 + 3ǫ
log2
2ǫ
1 + ǫ
,
Ibit(A : B) =
(3− ǫ)2
(3− ǫ)2 + 4ǫ log2
2(3− ǫ)2
(3− ǫ)2 + 4ǫ
+
4ǫ
(3− ǫ)2 + 4ǫ log2
8ǫ
(3 − ǫ)2 + 4ǫ (17)
for the resulting mutual information between Alice and
Bob for the two key sequences. For ǫ = 0.1, their weighted
sum 12 (ptritItrit + pbitIbit) equals 96.4% of the Shannon
limit, the mutual information of the joint probabilities in
table 2. As functions of ǫ, Ibit(A : B) and Itrit(A : B) are
the monotonously decreasing curves in figs. 2 and 3 below,
respectively.
Security analysis. – Eve is given full control of the
source and is allowed to keep a quantum record, encoded
in ancilla states, of what is sent. We write the source state
in the form
|S〉 = |++ E1〉+ |+− E2〉+ |−+ E3〉+ |−− E4〉 , (18)
where, for example, | + − E2〉 is the ‘+’ state of (10) for
Alice’s signal qubit, the ‘−’ state for Bob’s, and Eve’s
ancilla in state |E2〉. When Alice’s POM gives the jth
outcome, and Bob’s the kth, the reduced ancilla state is
described by |Ejk〉 where j and k independently take on
values of A, B, or C. After accounting for the coefficients
in (10) and (13), we have
|Ejk〉 =
(|E1〉, |E2〉, |E3〉, |E4〉) 1
3

ω−j−k
ω−j+k
ωj−k
ωj+k
 (19)
with ABC=̂012 for the j and k values in the exponents.
The joint probabilities of table 2 impose the constraints
pjk = 〈Ejk|Ejk〉 = ǫ
9
δjk +
3− ǫ
18
(1 − δjk) , (20)
which in turn imply
〈E1|E1〉+ 〈E2|E2〉+ 〈E3|E3〉+ 〈E4|E4〉 = 1 ,
〈E1|E2〉+ 〈E3|E4〉 = 0 = 〈E1|E3〉+ 〈E2|E4〉 ,
〈E1|E4〉 = 0 , 〈E2|E3〉 = −(1− ǫ)/2 . (21)
These determine nine of the 16 real parameters that spec-
ify the positive 4× 4 matrix of the 〈Ej |Ek〉 amplitudes.
A convenient choice of the remaining seven real param-
eters is given by representing the kets |E1〉, . . . , |E4〉 by
the columns of a matrix of the form [9]
V =

a1 λa2 −µa2 0
0 r1 cos θ −r2eiφ sin θ 0
0 r1e
−iφ sin θ −r2 cos θ 0
0 µ∗a1 −λ∗a1 a2
 , (22)
where a1, a2, r1, r2, φ, θ are real and λ, µ are complex, and
their values are subject to(
1 + |λ|2 + |µ|2)(a21 + a22)+ r21 + r22 = 1 ,
λ∗µ
(
a21 + a
2
2
)
+ r1r2e
iφ sin(2θ) =
1− ǫ
2
. (23)
As demonstrated by
a1 = a2 =
1
2
√
ǫ , r1 = r2 =
1
2
√
2− ǫ , λ = µ = 0 ,
φ = 0 , sin(2θ) =
2− 2ǫ
2− ǫ , (24)
for which Alice and Bob’s reduced two-qubit state is ρǫ
of (15), there surely are permissible values, but it is not
obvious which set of parameters is optimal for Eve. With
the aid of (19), each permissible V matrix gives us valid
column representations for the |Ejk〉s.
In fact, Eve is not interested in distinguishing the |Ejk〉
states themselves but rather the two-ancilla states that are
associated with symbols in the key sequences, whereby the
bit and trit cases need to be considered separately.
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In the bit case, the two-ancilla state conditioned on Alice
concluding that Bob has the letter sequence ‘jk’ is given
by
ρ
(A)
jk ∝ |EkjElk〉〈EkjElk|+ |EljEjk〉〈EljEjk|
+|EkjEjk〉〈EkjEjk|+ |EkkElj〉〈EkkElj |
+|ElkEjj〉〈ElkEjj |+ |EkkEjj〉〈EkkEjj | , (25)
where jkl can be any permutation of ABC. The first three
terms account for the cases in which Alice and Bob record
the same bit value, and the bit errors are covered by the
last three terms. For example, the first term is for the
situation when Alice has ‘kl’ and Bob has ‘jk’ while both
have ‘kj’ for the last term. Eve has to tell ρ
(A)
jk and ρ
(A)
kj
apart when Bob announces that his letters are ‘j’ and ‘k’.
Analogously, in the trit case, we have the conditioned
two-ancilla state
ρ
(A)
j ∝ |EkjElj〉〈EkjElj |+ |EljEkj〉〈EljEkj |
+|EkkElk〉〈EkkElk|+ |ElkEkk〉〈ElkEkk|
+|EklEll〉〈EklEll|+ |EllEkl〉〈EllEkl| (26)
when Alice concludes that Bob has letter ‘j’ twice, with
the first two terms accounting for a correct assignment
and the remaining four terms for errors. Here, too, jkl is
a permutation of ABC, and Eve need to distinguish the
three states ρ
(A)
A , ρ
(A)
B , and ρ
(A)
C .
The six ρ
(A)
jk s and three ρ
(A)
j s account for 54 of the 81
two-ancilla kets |EjkEj′k′〉. This is as it should be because
the remaining 27 kets are those for which Alice has the
same letter twice, and this situation does not occur.
If Eve eavesdrops on Bob, the conditioned two-ancilla
states are different. In the bit case we have
ρ
(B)
jk ∝ |EkjElk〉〈EkjElk|+ |EljEjk〉〈EljEjk|
+|EkjEjk〉〈EkjEjk|+ |EljEkk〉〈EljEkk|
+|EjjElk〉〈EjjElk|+ |EjjEkk〉〈EjjEkk| , (27)
and the states
ρ
(B)
j ∝ |EkjElj〉〈EkjElj |+ |EljEkj〉〈EljEkj |
+|EjjElj〉〈EjjElj |+ |EljEjj〉〈EljEjj |
+|EjjEkj〉〈EjjEkj |+ |EkjEjj〉〈EkjEjj | (28)
apply in the trit case. They differ from their respective
counterparts by the error terms. Therefore, we explore
both sets of ancilla states to see whether Eve gains any
advantage by eavesdropping on either Alice or Bob, or if
it does not make any difference to the optimal amount of
information she can obtain.
With the assignment of signal-qubit Pauli operators X ,
Y , Z discussed above in the context of (10), the two-qubit
state ρAB that the source distributes to Alice and Bob is
specified by the eight fixed expectations values
〈XA〉 = 〈ZA〉 = 〈XB〉 = 〈ZB〉 = 0 ,
〈XAXB〉 = 〈ZAZB〉 = −(1− ǫ) ,
〈XAZB〉 = 〈ZAXB〉 = 0 (29)
together with the seven adjustable expectation values
1
2
(〈YA〉 ± 〈YB〉) =
{
a21 − a22 ,
r21 − r22 − (|λ|2 − |µ|2)(a21 − a22) ,
〈YAZB〉+ i〈YAXB〉 = 4λa1a2 ,
〈ZAYB〉+ i〈XAYB〉 = −4µa1a2 ,
〈YAYB〉 = 2(a21 + a22)− 1 , (30)
which reveal the physical significance of the seven free
parameters in (22). Alice and Bob cannot distinguish
between ρAB, XAXBρABXAXB, YAYBρABYAYB , and
ZAZBρABZAZB, and Eve gets the same amount of infor-
mation from the corresponding four sets of conditioned an-
cilla states. It follows that Eve can just as well choose the
parameters in (22) such that ρAB = XAXBρABXAXB =
ZAZBρABZAZB. Then, the six expectation values in (30)
that involve a single Y vanish, which happens for
a1 = a2 , r1 = r2 , λ = µ = 0 . (31)
Indeed, it is plausible, and supported by much numerical
evidence, that a parameter choice that yields such a par-
ticularly noisy ρAB is advantageous for Eve because then
the entanglement between her ancilla and the qubits for
Alice and Bob is particularly strong.
With (31), matrix V takes on the simple one-parameter
form
V =
1
2

√
c 0 0 0
0 x −y 0
0 y −x 0
0 0 0
√
c
 (32)
with 0 ≤ c ≤ 2ǫ and x± y =
√
2− c± 2(1− ǫ). We re-
turn to (24) for c = ǫ, while c = 2ǫ and c = 2ǫ− ǫ2 give
the ρABs with minimal concurrence and maximal entropy,
respectively; the ρABs for 2ǫ+ c ≥ 2 are separable [10].
The following observation lends additional support to
(31) and (32): The resulting conditioned ancilla states are
such that it does not matter which letter pairs ‘jk’ and
‘kj’ are to be distinguished in the bit case, or which letter
‘j’ is the actual one in the trit case. Eve does not acquire
better knowledge about a subset of key entries at the price
of knowing less about other subsets. By contrast, such an
asymmetry in her knowledge is typically the case if some
of the single-Y expectation values in (30) are nonzero.
Accepting thus the hypothesis that it suffices to con-
sider matrices V of the single-parameter form (32), we
take the resulting two-ancilla kets |Ejk〉 and calculate the
Holevo-Schumacher-Westmoreland (HSW) bounds [11,12]
on I(A : E) and I(B : E) as a function of c. After optimiz-
ing the value of c for the given value of the noise parameter
ǫ, we obtain the monotonically increasing curves in figs. 2
and 3 for the bit key and the trit key, respectively.
The ǫ values for which these curves intersect the curves
representing the corresponding I(A : B) of (17) determine
the noise thresholds below which Alice and Bob can gener-
ate a secret key from the raw key by the usual procedures
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Fig. 2: Optimizing the one-parameter source state: Wiretap-
per bound for Eve eavesdropping on the bit key. For Alice, the
noise threshold is ǫ = 0.197, where Ibit = 0.560. The corre-
sponding numbers for Bob are ǫ = 0.170, Ibit = 0.603.
of error correction and privacy amplification [13]. Both in
the bit case and in the trit case, the thresholds are higher
when Eve is eavesdropping on Alice than on Bob. We
could not find lower thresholds with any parameter values
not restricted by the symmetry requirements (31).
Summary and discussion. – We described a basis-
independent trine protocol for QKD that uses RFF signal
qubits encoded in mixed states of three physical qubits.
The protocol exploits a novel efficient key generation
scheme that yields a dual alphabet key. We analyzed the
security with a plausible symmetry assumption that sim-
plifies the task to the optimization of a single parameter.
As a consequence of the asymmetric roles played by them
during the key generation, there are different noise thresh-
olds for eavesdropping on Alice and Bob.
The raw keys need to be processed before Alice and Bob
share a secret key. For the error correction and the privacy
amplification one of the raw keys serves as the error-free
reference, and we choose Alice’s key for this purpose be-
cause then the higher thresholds apply. We conclude that
a secret key can be generated for ǫ < 0.197, and one should
stay well below this threshold to have a good key bit rate.
Regarding practical implementations of the scheme, we
note that the production of entangled states is no routine
matter, with the difficulty increasing rapidly with size.
A practical system with a common source for Alice and
Bob requires six entangled physical qubits for each trans-
mission. It is easier to use the variant where Alice pre-
pares the states and sends them to Bob as this requires
only three qubits. As with other QKD protocols, photon
polarization is the most likely candidate for the physical
qubits. Alice could prepare three-photon trine states by
first preparing two of the three photons in a Bell state and
the third photon with random polarization; it is possible
to achieve this by beginning with an entangled four-photon
state and measuring the polarization of the fourth photon
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Fig. 3: Optimizing the one-parameter source state: Wiretap-
per bound for Eve eavesdropping on the trit key. For Alice,
the noise threshold is ǫ = 0.193, where Itrit = 0.618. The
corresponding numbers for Bob are ǫ = 0.150, Itrit = 0.744.
with a suitable POM. Bob’s POM would then test if one of
the three orthogonal Bell states is present for every trio of
photons received from Alice. Given the limited efficiency
of typical photodetectors, efficient detection of all three
photons is a challenge though.
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